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COMMENT  
Roel A. Jongeneel 
Introduction 
In 1998 the book The wealth and poverty of nations was published, written by 
David Landes, a retired professor in economic history from Harvard. Within a 
few months more than 50.000 hardcover copies were sold of this best-selling 
book. In that book, with its 544 pages, Landes tries to answer the question why 
in some countries and regions the economies are performing well and why 
others remain backward. Differences in economic performance are 
subsequently explained by differences in culture and religion. With the West-
Europeans and their descendants in the US, Canada and Australia yielding the 
best performance, his answer is that the capitalist values and Calvinist religion 
are the main explanatory factors.1 In fact these are the old stories of Adam 
Smith and Max Weber, but now told by a good writer. Recalling the theme of 
our session, say ‘Economics within the context of Cultures and Christianity’, I 
expected a paper which would re-examine (and criticize) the Landes story 
from a christian philosophical perspective. 
 García de la Sienra has done something rather different. His focus is less on 
history and cultural differences, but rather on theory and how to integrate this 
with a christian world view. He contributed an interesting paper, albeit one 
that is sometimes very technical. For some of us this might be even confusing. 
However, at the same time he makes a serious effort to communicate his view 
to the economic community by addressing them in their own specialized and 
formal language.2 So he respects their ‘culture’, but at the same time tries to 
get them thinking of a christian view on economic life, which is clearly one of 
the aims of our conference.  
 
Globalization  
García de la Sienra starts his paper with connecting the issue of the globaliz- 
ing economy with Dooyeweerds remarks on the laws of historical develop- 
ment. I agree with him that globalization is a kind of world integration, but a 
distorted one. Following Goudzwaard and De Lange, noted problems are 
poverty, pollution, unemployment, speculation). The main contribution 
  
1   One exception to this general rule is Japan. 
2   With respect to the technical part of the paper it is a pity that the proofs are omitted 
since they are in not all cases trivial. Part of the problems introduce so-called non-con-
vexities, which in general create serious problems for the used optimization framework. 
Examples of these non-convexities are increasing returns to scale, externalities, redis-
tributing taxation schemes. 
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García de la Sienra makes is not to analyse the globalization issue as such, but 
rather to propose a very general framework to handle these problems in a 
systematic way and from a reformational perspective. Because globalization is 
still in mind, the paper has a strong focus on the world-individual or 
micro/macro distinction. Due to this mindset, some important things are 
overlooked (role of institutions, regions, meso-level, etc.) or paid less attention 
to. 
 
Christian and secularized economics  
Geertsema (1995, 17) remarked that Dooyeweerd did not see a big gap 
between the specific sciences as approached from a christian or secularized 
perspective. He saw the main impact to be on the field of philosophy in 
general, and the philosophy of knowledge in particular. García de la Sienra 
more or less operates in this line. In fact he accepts the neoclassical theory of 
consumer and producer behaviour hardly without suggesting any modi-
fication. To a lesser extent this also holds for the normative branch, in 
particular the Bergsonian welfare economics. 
 I think secularized neo-classical economics has its value, in particular when 
the focus is on understanding issues of allocation and (marginal) changes 
therein. However, its explanatory power is conditional on a host of 
assumptions, which among others imply that the theory has essentially a static 
character (in contrast with for example Marxian economic theory, which 
explicitly considers the historical dynamics). Moreover, the normative view it 
has on man and mankind cannot be called Christian, although it takes into 
account essential elements of fallen man. As such it has descriptive or 
explanatory power, but because it accepts ‘what is’ in a non-critical way, it falls 
short in analyzing ‘what should be’.3 
 In my opinion, what is needed when taking over elements from secularized 
economics is to rethink them and re-interpret them. Moreover, a number of 
things have to be added and others have to be deleted. From that perspective it 
is a pity that García de la Sienra not explores the significant changes that have 
taken place in economic theory, but rather sticks to the restrictive neo-classical 
microeconomics. I think of the development of the new institutional 
economics, which corrects (or at least tries to do so) for the a-institutional 
approach of classical micro. Moreover, it pays attention to the role of norms in 
economics. I also mention the game theoretical approach to human 
behaviour, which contributed a lot to our understanding of economic 
coordination and under what conditions it might fail. 
 Being happy with those recent developments in economic theory does not 
mean that I think they are sufficient. Therefore they remain too much 
modifications within a questionable world view. A particular characteristic of 
the economic view on people and their world still is utilitarianism. In its 
  
3   Another reason why (at least parts of) it make sense is because as an empirical science 
it is bound to reality. 
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crudest form, associated with Bentham, people are simply motivated by the 
desire to gain pleasure and avoid pain. Shortly, an individual’s goal in life is to 
promote his or her own interest, preserve his or her own life, increase his or 
her own pleasures, etc. 
 In its adjusted form it makes a concession to the complexity of human 
behavior, by allowing that utility can be derived from, for example, being 
charitable to others. By expanding it in this way, they tried to explain a much 
wider range of human behaviour (think of bequest motive, salvation motive, 
taste for discrimination, interdependent preferences). 
 Both approaches are weak with respect to acknowledging the positive-
normative divide. From a Christian perspective we should critically examine 
them. Loving oneself may not be reduced to promoting simply one’s own 
interest. But even if so, God tells us, however, that it is only half of the picture. 
The other part is loving ones neighbour. This is not only a request or 
command, but fortunately also an element of our nature, albeit one that might 
got quite affected by sin. I would like to make a plea for the motive of care, as 
an alternative motive besides promoting one’s own interest, which should be 
taken into account to really get a balanced picture of how people behave both 
in general and in the economic sphere.  
 
Within economics there is a third view, which hardly can be called 
utilitarianism, but which needs new consideration. In that approach (see most 
modern microeconomics textbooks) utility is a formal designation. It is 
whatever consumers maximize, but economists and textbooks are unwilling 
and/or unable to specify what it is. I understand this as a search in economics 
for finding a common denominator. In my opinion, based on what I have 
learned from reformational philosophy, economists are right when they think 
that there should be some common ‘economic’ denominator which cannot be 
reduced to ethics, psychology, etc. Here we touch on the issue what the own 
sphere of economics exactly stands for, and how we should approximate its 
significance, or, in Dooyweerdian language, its kernel of meaning. We should 
be able to make a contribution here. Interesting work has been done already 
by Cramp, Goudzwaard, Haan, Kee, and Storkey. 
 
Social welfare function approach 
What I said with respect to classical micro-economics, the positive branch of 
economic theory, holds even more for the normative branch, known as welfare 
economics. Indeed, García de la Sienra is critical here. He adopts the 
Bergsonian social welfare function approach, but at the same time explicitly 
rejects welfarism: obtaining a social welfare function by means of aggregating 
local preferences. Here I would like to make five comments.  
 1)  The social welfare function approach in one way or another subsumes 
an optimizing agent, usually the government as a benevolent and omniscient 
dictator. From a reformational perspective the primary task of the government  
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is to ensure and strive for public justice. Of course this has an economic aspect 
and allows for pursuing an economic policy, but does not coincide with the 
maximization perspective behind the social welfare maximization approach 
(see Beukes and Van Niekerk-Fourie, 1993). 
 2)  The social welfare approach has also been criticized for other (more 
practical) reasons. In particular the public choice-school in economics has 
argued that the government is not a monolithic unity, but an institution 
comprised of politicians and bureaucrats, which each have their own goals (re-
election and vote-maximization, expanding budgets). Moreover, they are 
under continuous pressure of (one-issue) interest groups. At a more theoreti-
cal level, Arrow has shown the impossibility of aggregating local preferences in 
a consistent social welfare function. Arrows impossibility theorem of course 
primarily attacks welfarism, but also indirectly hurts García de la Sienra’s 
approach. 
 3)  A social welfare function is a function. García de la Sienra uses his NF as 
such a function, but he has in fact to think in terms of sets. I think he is not 
really consistent here. We should indeed think about the economy in terms of 
a set: the space allowed for discretion. Doing this in a consequent way changes 
the focus more to norms that should be respected in economic life rather than 
to an optimal (welfare) state. 
 I agree with García de la Sienra that, given the fallen mankind and the 
associated presence of sin and brokenness, one should think sometimes in 
terms of feasible compromises, which implicitly suggest that there is a trade-off 
between norms (and their realizations) at least in practical life. The NF might 
be seen as a device that precisely realizes this. However, a social welfare 
function suggests a stable preference relationship, while compromises of the 
kind just described can be better understood in terms of incidental choices 
which are circumstance- rather than preference-related. 
 4)  I think García de la Sienra’s paper falls short in taking into account two 
interesting recent contributions in the field of normative economics: 
 
a) Amartya Sen (1992), who recently won the Nobel prize in econo-
mics and is an expert in the field of social choice and welfare 
economics, has struggled for years with the social welfare function 
approach. Finally he adopted a completely different framework. He 
now thinks in terms of capabilities, functionings and freedom, and offers 
a nice example of an approach more promising than the social 
welfare function one. In my opinion his work cannot be ignored in a 
really reformational approach. 
b) Ammittai Etzioni (1988) offers another approach, which might be 
called a two-utility structure. In his interesting work, he upholds a 
fundamental distinction between ‘economics’ and ‘ethics’. I think 
the framework he proposes deserves more attention from a 
reformational perspective. An interesting point is that he comes to a 
more enriched paradigm, which also changes standard neo-classical 
approach into a more balanced one. 
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A reformational agenda in economics 
García de la Sienra tries to formulate a reformational agenda in economics, 
by, firstly, interpreting his NF framework in a dynamic context.4 Relying on 
growth theory, he concludes that one of the most pressing problems the world 
economy faces is population growth. If population does not stabilize, a 
stationary or golden age program is simply not possible. I think he should have 
taken technical change and (human) capital into account. Not doing so easily 
generates doom scenarios which fortunately never come true, but may be 
misleading (cf. Club of Rome). In terms of research agenda a central question 
is what is a system of sustainable needs that maximizes the NF. 
 Secondly, García de la Sienra discusses the relationship between lower-level 
individual economic behaviour and upper-level central planning. He 
emphasizes both the possibility and necessity of a real market economy, albeit 
one in a bounded space.5 As I argued before, saying this requires that the 
outcome of the upper-level maximization is a space for individual discretion 
rather than a unique welfare optimum. I think García de la Sienra’s distinction 
between ‘large scale economics’ and ‘micro economics’ is much too simple. 
There is much more between the global and the individual which must not be 
neglected. Especially from a reformational perspective we should be aware of 
the plurality and diversification in creation and thus also in the economy. What 
is needed is a structural analysis of both economic behavior and the economic 
process. Some issues should be solved at the local level of the individual. Other 
issues should be dealt with at the level of the village, the county, the state, the 
region, the multinational enterprise, etc. Some should be dealt with at a world 
level, and a lot should be dealt with at several levels simultaneously. It depends 
on the structure of the economy as well as on the policy issue at which level the 
problem should be treated and responsibilities addressed.  
 I agree with García de la Sienra, that the most important research area is an 
analysis of economic normativity from a reformational perspective. With 
respect to this, both economic and non-economic norms are relevant. García 
de la Sienra’s paper does not make a contribution to the search for economic 
normativity as such. But the framework he proposes suggests that economic 
normativity has to do with imposing constraints from the outside on the 
economic process or behaviour. Therewith he downplays that there also is, 
what I would call, ‘normativity from within’ which is relevant. Economics not 
only should be normative, i.e. satisfying moral and ethical considerations, but it 
also is intrinsically normative (see Jongeneel, 2000).  
 An important issue in this respect is not only to figure out what the relevant 
norms are, but also how responsibilites are defined. In particular with respect 
to the latter much work has to be done. Moreover, I think we will see that a 
  
4   For the sake of consistency, the aggregation over time requires NF to be specified as 
time dependent and/or to be redefined in its arguments. 
5   Necessity is argued for by referring to the two well-known fundamental welfare 
theorems, which also hold in a bounded economy-context. 
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globalizing economy requires strong states rather than weak ones, properly 
institutionalized firms rather than simple share-holder devices for raising short-
run cash money. So an additional issue for the agenda is the analysis of 
institutional structures encouraging responsible and sustainable economic 
behavior. That is also an area where we can make a contribution (think of 
Goudzwaard’s (1988) work on causality in economics). 
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